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Abstract—Many organizations have great deal of conﬁdential
information which is stored on computers. Such information
is desired to be kept securely yet giving a convenience of
accessibility from any part of the world. For data security,
one can use an encrypting ﬁle system such as eCryptfs [1],
dmCrypt [2], File Vault [3]. However these encrypting ﬁle systems
do not address the problem of accessing ﬁles over network
from public computers. In this case the public host, the actual
FileServer host and the network between them are vulnerable
to many attacks. This paper discusses the major problems and
proposes a solution for the same using TransCrypt [4] encrypting
ﬁle system. It also describes how the proposed solution can be
implemented on a Linux-based environment.
Index Terms—FileServer (FS), WorkStation (WS), Encrypted
File System (EFS), TransCrypt, SmartCard (SC), Network File
System (NFS).
I. INTRODUCTION
Many organizations and institutions use centralized storage
devices. As a consequence of this, securing conﬁdential data
against thefts which eventually impose risks of losing impor-
tant personal and organizational data, is of utmost importance.
Such attacks include the attacker getting access to ﬁles on
shared storage, modifying the contents of those ﬁles etc.
Using strong Cryptographic techniques these attacks can be
avoided by keeping conﬁdential data in an encrypted manner.
Therefore, there is a need for a storage solution which uses
strong cryptographic methods to protect data.
Several solutions have been devised to address this prob-
lem. This include File Vault [3], eCryptfs [1], dm-crypt [2],
Microsoft EFS [5] etc. These encrypting ﬁle systems provide
security by encrypting and decrypting user data thereby ad-
dressing the problem of data security in many different ways,
such as per-ﬁle encryption, ﬂexible key sharing and inclusion
of superuser in the trust model. Another encrypting ﬁle system
TransCrypt [4] was designed to provide a very strong solution
to the problem of securing data in a user transparent manner
by our group.
TransCrypt is an enterprise-class, kernel-space encrypting
ﬁle system for the Linux operating system, which incorporates
an advanced key management scheme to provide a high grade
of security, while remaining transparent and easily usable. It
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provides per-user access control, per-ﬁle encryption and per-
volume managerical control. However it is not designed to
work over network and hence does not address the security
issues when the data is accessed over network from public
computers.
Fig. 1. Model of ﬁle access in Public Networks
In this paper, we discuss the problems that arise when secure
data is accessed from public computers over network and
propose a solution for the same using TransCrypt encrypting
ﬁle system. We assume the model shown in Fig 1 to develop
our solution. In this scenario, WS, FS and the network
channel between them are vulnerable to many attacks like user
masquerading attack, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack
and client spooﬁng. We make use of known cryptographic
methods like mutual authentication, process credentials and
session establishment to counter various attacks.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
TransCrypt [4] is a secure, usable, transparent, efﬁcient
enterprise-class encrypting ﬁle system for Linux. It has
stronger trust model and hence stronger security compared to
other existing encrypting ﬁle systems. In this system only the
kernel remains under the trust domain of the user. TransCrypt
uses per-ﬁle cryptographic keys for ﬂexible ﬁle sharing. It
includes a set of simple userspace daemons and support
utilities for administration. It reuses pre-established enterprise
security frameworks such as Public Key Infrastructure for user
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etc.
In the initial version of TransCrypt [4], the implementation
was tightly coupled with the ext3 ﬁle system. TransCrypt mod-
iﬁed on-disk structures to store additional meta-data required
for its functionality. These modiﬁcations also included changes
to the userspace e2fsprogs package which contains libraries
and tools to work with ext3 volumes. A tight integration with
ext3 ﬁle system made TransCrypt incompatible with other
advanced ﬁle systems. The newer version of transcrypt was
re-architectured [6] to employ a layered architecture, with its
layers being ﬁle system independent. It used the extended
attributes support provided by the ﬁle systems for metadata
storage. With this mechanism, a great deal of ﬂexibility and
code maintainability is achieved.
In addition, the earlier implementation of TransCrypt [4]
also modiﬁed the ﬁle I/O functionality of the kernel. Hence it
had several performance and maintenance related limitations.
Additionally, TransCrypt implementation used page cache for
its operations. The direct I/O operations where page cache
is bypassed, could not be supported by TransCrypt. For
perfomance reasons, direct I/O operations are extensively used
by applications such as database management systems etc. The
new version of TransCrypt [7] uses a layer of cryptography
to achieve modularity and direct I/O support [8]. This support
is based on the device-mapper infrastructure [2] of the Linux
kernel.
III. ISSUES
The default authentication mechanism of NFS [9] is UID
based, when user accesses ﬁles over network. On the other
hand, TransCrypt authenticates the user by sending a chal-
lenge, the response to which is computed by the user’s private
key store (PKS). The TransCrypt authentication mechanism is
much more stronger than the UID based authentication as it
uses asymmetric key cryptography. However TransCrypt is not
designed to work over the network. Current implementation of
TransCrypt looks for user’s PKS only on the FS and not on
WS where the user has logged in and hence sends the user
authentication messages to FS instead of WS. The TransCrypt
design is also vulnerable to many other attacks while accessing
ﬁles over network from a workstation (WS). This section
discusses the major attacks in detail.
A. Masquerading attack
A masquerading attack takes place when an entity poses
itself as another entity. This is the attack in which a privileged
user can acquire the identity of another user (e.g. using ‘su -’)
and can access the ﬁles of a genuine TransCrypt user. The NFS
suffers from this problem due to its UID based authentication.
This attack is illustrated in Fig 2. Let us assume that user
usr1 is logged in on machine WS1 with its smart card on
machine WS1. At the same time user usr2 can get maliciously
access to ﬁles of user usr1 if it has superuser credentials on
a machine WS2. For this, usr2 logs in to machine WS2 and
acquires the identity of usr1 (using ‘su - usr1’). In order to
get access to ﬁles of usr1, usr2 would send an access request
to FS host as usr1. FS host uses the TransCrypt access control
mechanism to get access to the operations with private key of
usr1 (earlier registered at WS1) and thus provides access to
usr2.
Fig. 2. Masquerading attack over Network
B. Man-in-the-middle attack
In this attack, an attacker actively monitors the trafﬁc,
captures and controls the communication transparently be-
tween two entities. For example, an attacker can re-route a
data exchange. When computers are communicating at low
levels of the network layer, the computers might not be able
to determine with whom they are exchanging data. Attacker
makes independent connections with two entities and relays
messages between them. The attacker makes them to believe
that they are talking directly to each other over a private
connection when in fact the entire conversation is seen and
controlled by the attacker.
Fig. 3. Man In the Middle attack
Consider Fig 3, where user usr1 on machine WS1 wants to
access its ﬁles from FS over the network. Meanwhile, user
usr2 on machine WS2 may eavesdrop on the conversation.
To get started, usr1 sends the ﬁle identiﬁer and his user ID
to FS over the network. The user usr2 is able to intercept
it, thereby initiating a man-in-the-middle attack. usr2 sends
a forged message to FS claiming to originate from usr1 at
WS2. FS, believing this message to originate from usr1 at
WS2, sends the response to WS2. Now usr2 depending on his
desire, can send altered data to WS1. When usr1 receives the
message, it believes the response to come from the genuine
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ﬁle and is even able to alter his data.
C. Replay Attack
Replay attack involves the re-use of captured data at a later
time than originally intended, in order to repeat some action of
beneﬁt to the attacker. In our scenario, the attacker can capture
the packets containing ﬁle handle information (of a genuine
user) and can replay it later to get access to those ﬁles.
IV. OUR APPROACH
Current implementation of TransCrypt looks for user’s PKS
only on the FS and not on WS where user is logged in. This
can be solved by registering user’s PKS with the FS kernel.
FS kernel will store this location and during subsequent ﬁle
operations, authentication messages will be sent to the user’s
registered PKS location.
This section describes an approach to solve the attacks when
users access ﬁles over network from a workstation using NFS.
A. User masquerading attack
NFS is prone to user masquerading attack. Hence processes
of the attacker session can have the UID same as that of the
genuine user (usr). UID based authentication is not sufﬁcient
to protect TransCrypt volume from this attack. FS kernel must
have mechanisms to differentiate between the genuine session
and a masqueraded session in order to mitigate this attack. To
differentiate between these two sessions, we need to establish
some unique credentials between the user login process and the
FS kernel. During any ﬁle access, these credentials will also
be sent to the FS. FS kernel will verify these credentials and
give access to only those operations coming from a genuine
user. Since the masqueraded sessions won’t have the correct
credentials, it won’t get access to the ﬁles.
B. Man-in-the-middle attack
This attack is solved by establishing a session key between
the WS and the FS. All further communication between the
hosts will go encrypted with this symmetric key along with
message integrity code. The attacker cannot have this session
key and hence cannot interpret the messages or modify them
without being noticed.
C. Replay Attack
This attack is solved by sending the ﬁle operation responses
to the genuine user, encrypted with a freshly generated session
key. Only the genuine user will have the correct credential and
the session key. These keys (session key and credential) are
established at log in time to maintain the freshness so that
replay attacks are avoided.
V. PROTOCOLS
This section describes the Trust Model which we assumed
in developing the protocol, the Negotiation protocol which
establishes the common cryptographic parameters (between
FS and WS) and the secure protocol which enables transcrypt
work over network. Secure Protocol registers the user PKS,
perfoms mutual authentication and establishes session key
between FS and WS kernel.
A. Trust Model
There are two main entities in our model, namely Work
Station and FileServer. Trust model assumed for these entities
are described below.
1) WorkStation
• Super user on WS is partially trusted not to substi-
tute the kernel image with a malicious version over
a system reboot.
• WS login program is trusted to assign randomly
generated credentials provided by the FS to correct
login session only and not to any malicious user’s
login session.
• WS kernel is trusted, not to assign credentials to
processes created by malicious user and to send the
correct credentials when user is accessing transcrypt
volumes.
2) FileServer
• FS kernel is trusted not to leak ﬁle encryption keys
and the ﬁle system keys used in TransCrypt.
• Super user on FS is partially trusted not to substitute
the kernel image with a malicious version over a
system reboot.
B. Negotiation Protocol
Our solution is based on strong cryptographic methods to
support mutual authentication and establishment of session
keys between FS and user’s PKS. It makes TransCrypt robust
enough to work over network. For this protocol to work,
the PKS and FS should agree upon the PKI algorithms and
the lengths of cryptographic challenges prior to the start of
communication.
PKS can be any secure device such as SmartCard, Mobile
Phone, USB tokens etc., which supports public key infras-
tructure (PKI). We assume that SmartCard is the PKS in our
environment, since it is one of the most secure tool to keep
secret keys. Fig 4 explains the negotiation protocol in detail.
When a SmartCard (SC) connects to the reader, the WS
sends a HELO message with a list of supported parameters
such as challenge lengths and set of algorithm identiﬁers
for various cryptographic algorithms to the FS. Algorithm
identiﬁer consists of algorithm name and other parameters like
key length, cipher speciﬁcation etc. When FS gets the HELO
message, it selects the most suitable algorithm and parameters
from among those that it received from the client and sends a
WELCOME message (which contains the chosen parameters)
to the SC.
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C. Secure Protocol
The secure protocol enables transcrypt to work over NFS.
It consists of mainly two steps.
1) PKS Registration: Location of the user’s PKS is con-
veyed to Transcrypt for sending the authentication messages
when user accesses the transcrypt volumes. This is done by
registering user’s PKS location to the FS kernel. FS kernel
stores this location (known as SCURI for Smart Card Uniform
Resource Identiﬁer) and sends authentication messages for ﬁle
access to the corresponding user’s PKS.
The FS host needs the identiﬁcation of the user logged on
the WS before giving access to the ﬁles. On NFS, this
identiﬁcation is provided by a common UID. However this
is not possible in our case since the WS host is not under
the same administrative control. For the purpose of user’s
identiﬁcation we use the certiﬁcate of the user that is provided
by the user’s SC. The certiﬁcate is ﬁrst veriﬁed and the user’s
name is extracted from the certiﬁcate by the FS host. The login
program on the WS host facilitates this process by reading
the certiﬁcate from the SC and sending the user’s name along
with the UID at WS host and a uniform resource identiﬁer to
locate the user’s SC (SCURI) to the FS. The FS locates the
certiﬁcate from its repository by matching the certiﬁcate name
and veriﬁes the validity of the certiﬁcate.
2) Authenticate and establish a session between WS kernel
and FS kernel: To the counter various attacks mentioned
earlier, the FS and WS need to authenticate each other and
establish session keys for encryption and message integrity
before any ﬁle operations commence. The session keys are
generated using equal contributions of key material from two
sides.
The entire process is shown in Fig 5. In the ﬁgure EP
U, EP
FS
,EP
WS denotes Public Key encryption using the public key of
user U, ﬁle server FS and work station WS respectively.
1) FS kernel sends a random challenge (r_fs) and its
contribution of the session key (k_fs) to the WS login
process encrypted with the public key of the user.
2) WS login process forwards the message to the user’s
SC.
3) The SC decrypts the message using the private key of
the user. It sends back the response to the FS challenge
(r_fs), a random challenge (r_sc) and its contribution of
the session key (k_sc) to the WS login process encrypted
with the public key of the FS.
4) WS login process forwards the message to the FS.
5) FS kernel decrypts the message using its private key. It
veriﬁes the challenge response and if it is succeessful,
user is authenticated to FS, else the protocol is aborted.
After authentication, the FS kernel generates a random
and unique credential (SID) for this particular user
session. It then sends back the credential (SID) and
the SC challenge response (r_sc) to WS login process
encrypted with the public key of the user. FS kernel
now computes the session key (SK_fs_ws) using the
key materials (k_fs and k_sc) and maintains the state
information, (UID, SCURI, SID, SK_fs_ws) in a table
for future use.
6) WS login process forwards the same packet to the SC.
7) SC having the private key of the user decrypts the
message. It veriﬁes the challenge response (r_sc) and If
it is successful, FS is authenticated to the user, else the
protocol is aborted. After authentication, the SC com-
putes the session key (SK_fs_ws) using the key materials
(k_fs and k_sc). The WS has to be authenticated to the
user before passing the session key and the credential to
the WS kernel. The WS certiﬁcate is manually veriﬁed
by the user and is passed to the SC.
8) SC sends a random challenge (r) to the WS encrypted
with the public key of the WS host.
9) WS kernel decrypts the message and sends back the
response (r) to the SC.
10) At this point, WS is authenticated to the SC. SC
now passes the credential (SID) and the session key
(SK_fs_ws) to the WS login process encrypted with the
public key of the WS host.
WS login process now passes these blinded SID and SK_fs_ws
to the WS kernel. WS kernel extracts the keys (using its private
key) and assigns the credential to the user’s login process so
that all of its children inherit the same credentials.
VI. NFS OPERATIONS
During any ﬁle operations such as open, read, write by the
user, the NFS client sends the credential (SID) along with the
other standard parameters to the FS encrypted with the session
key (SK_fs_ws). FS decrypts the message using the session
key and veriﬁes the credential. If the veriﬁcation fails, FS
does not process the request further. FS also checks whether
the request came from the WS to which the SID is associated
and aborts the request if not. Fig 6 shows these steps in detail.
ES denotes Symmetric Key encryption in the ﬁgure. In case
of the read and write operations, the data to be read or to be
written can even be encrypted using IPsec or the session key
established (if needed).
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Fig. 6. NFS ﬁle operations
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
Our implementation of the protocol is a scalable one. It
involves changes in the NFS server as well as in the NFS
client.
A. NFS Server Changes
NFS server side changes include changes in certain compo-
nents of TransCrypt and changes in the NFS ﬁle system.
1) TransCrypt File System Changes: The user space as
well as kernel space components of TransCrypt are modiﬁed
to support credentials based executions. In the userspace we
modify the TransCrypt daemon to support initial authentication
protocol. In the kernel space we modify the TransCrypt to keep
the state information corresponding to every authenticated
user.
Each of these changes are explained in brief below.
• TransCrypt Daemon. All communication between FS
kernel and other entities (login process, SC) are routed
through TransCrypt daemon. The modiﬁed TransCrypt
kernel must keep a record of the PKS location of the user.
Therefore it must receive the PKS registration messages
as part of the secure protocol. To receive the user’s PKS
registration packets, TCP server functionality is added to
the current version of TransCrypt Daemon.
• Netlink Communication Manager. In the current Tran-
sCrypt version, the communication manager subsystem
supports only kernel initiated packets. It is not capable of
handling user initiated requests like those in the authenti-
cation protocol. The communication manager is modiﬁed
so that the messages related to different protocols are
handled appropriately.
• User Authentication Subsystem. This subsystem generates
the messages that are part of the initial authentication
protocol and then communicates them to the NFS Client
through the communication manager. It also stores the
credentials, user details and the session keys established
as part of the protocol in a shared data structure.
2) NFS ﬁle system changes: It includes changes in the
NFS ﬁle system. All NFS requests are handled by a function
“permission” to check for the genuineness of the request.
We modiﬁed this function, to verify whether the NFS client
requests originate from a genuine user session. If not, the
request is rejected.
B. NFS Client changes
The NFS Client implementation needs certain changes to
support the modiﬁed protocol. These changes are done in
user space as well as kernel space components of the NFS
client. The changes in the user space components of the
NFS client include the mechanisms to support the login
protocol and the support to contact SC through the smart card
daemon. The changes in the kernel space components include
the mechanism to assign the credentials to the processes as
explained earlier. These changes are described below.
• Login Patch. The changes in the login process must incor-
porate the mutual authentication between NFS sever and
client. This is done using the Pluggable Authentication
Module (PAM) [10]. This module provides two methods
to perform tasks associated with session set-up and to
perform tasks associated with session tear-down. In our
implementation session set-up method is used for mutual
authentication and session key establishment (between
User’s SmartCard and FS kernel). It also passes the per-
user session credentials obtained from the SC to the WS
kernel through a virtual I/O driver. During the session
tear-down, the FS kernel is informed about the session
termination so that it may remove the corresponding state
information.
• SmartCard Daemon. It has to take care of the full duplex
communication between NFS Client, login process and
user’s SC. It integrates PKCS #11 APIs [11] to commu-
nicate to the SC and socket support to communicate with
other entities (login process, transcrypt-daemon).
• Device Layer in kernel. The login process passes the
credentials to the kernel for assignment to the processes
as explained earlier. Such changes are done through
an installable device driver. The login process uses an
ioctl [12] call to perform this functionality.
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the NFS Client, WS kernel will pass the credentials
corresponding to the user to the NFS server. This along
with other parameters is relayed to the FS through the
secure channel established earlier between NFS server
and client. These modiﬁcations are done by patching the
NFS client code in the Linux kernel.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have discussed the security vulnerabilities,
when a user tries to access his ﬁles over an untrusted network.
We also proposed a secure and scalable protocol to solve the
same. The strong trust model in our implementation where
even administrators are not trusted distinguishes our solution
from other existing solutions. We have a scalable implemen-
tation of the solution in Linux environment using the open
source encrypted ﬁle system, TransCrypt [4]. The modularized
implementation helps an integration of the solution to any
environment. Our implementation is open source and can be
obtained through the home page of TransCrypt [7].
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